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ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation:

Oil Spill Response in Japan

Degree:

MSc

Oil spill response and preparedness is the one of the most important international
maritime challenges.
In Japan, The Nakhodka oil spill which was occurred in 1997 is the worst oil spill
accident from a vessel in the history of the country. This assessment of the
experiences from this accident indicated that there were room for improvement in
the country’s oil spill preparedness and response. However, the oil spills do not only
originate, but also from the vessels, but also offshore oil and gas industry.
Deepwater Horizon oil spill began on April 20, 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico is fresh in
our memory. This dissertation starts by examining the contingency plans in Japan,
United States, and Norway. In the Norwegian case, studying about the oil spill from
vessel, and in U.S. case, investigating the oil spill from the offshore industry based
on Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and the Exxon Valdez oil spill. In a following chapter,
the thesis investigates and assess the Japan’s oil spill response which was renewed
after the Nakhodka oil spill. A special attempt is made to assess the chain of
command (management structure). In a concluding chapter, this study will do
recommendations improvements in Japan’s contingency plan including some
recommendations regarding preparedness for spills from offshore oil and gas
industry oil spill.
KEYWORDS: Contingency plan, chain of command, dispersants
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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1Oil in the environment

1.1.1 Weathering processes acting on oil at sea
An oil spill on the sea will undergo a series of physical and chemical processes that
will affect the characteristics and effects of the oil over the time. The changing
chemical and physical processes are often called weathering. Figure 1 shows the
typical weathering process which includes spreading, evaporation, dispersion,
emulsification, dissolution, photo-oxidation, sedimentation and sinking, shoreline
interaction and biodegradation. Among these phenomenon, spreading, evaporation,
dispersion and emulsification are important in the early stages of the spill whereas
photo-oxidation, sedimentation and biodegradation are long-term processes that
determine the ultimate fate of the oil (ITOPF, 2011). Of these phenomena,
emulsification is especially a nasty issue. Many oils take up water and form water-inoil emulsions. This water-in-oil emulsion reduces the rate of other weathering
processes (e.g. spreading or dispersion), and it is the main reason for the
persistence of light and medium crude oils on the sea surface and shoreline
(ITOPF2011). Once oil is spilled, it begins to weather and its physical and chemical
characteristic change over time. Therefore, it is important to have a flexible
response to spilled oil depending on the sextent of weathering of the oil.

Fig.1 Weathering Processes Acting on Oil at Sea.
source: ITOPF TECHNICAL INFORMATION PAPER, FATE OF MARINE OIL
SPILLS

1.1.2 Oil control equipment
As major examples, there are 3 kind of oil control equipment for use when the oil is
floating on the water: “booms”, “dispersants” and “skimmers”. First oil control
equipment is booms. It is the floating barriers designed to perform oil containment
and concentration, deflection and protection. Of these functions, the most important
one is oil containment or deflection capability, and it is determined by its behavior in
relation to water movement. Oil booms can be a difficult and potentially hazardous
operation during the deployment. When the oil spill accidents occur, the weather is
mostly severe with rough seas. Therefore, high waves impose limitations on
operations and the handling of wet and oily equipment on vessel that are pitching
and rolling. Activities on beach under such circumstances demanding and can place
personnel at risk. The second method to control oil spills at sea is the use of
dispersants. As already discussed, some amount of the oil in the sea will disperse
naturally (refer to Fig.1). Therefore, the characteristic of dispersants is to enhance
natural dispersion by reducing the surface tension at the oil/water interface, making
it easier for wave motion to create many smaller oil droplets. However, dispersants
using has some important points. The most important factors for the successful use
of dispersants are the sea conditions and the oil properties. Without a minimum
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amount of wave energy, the use of dispersants will not be successful, and most
dispersants are unable to disperse very viscous oils and stable emulsions. The third
method to deal with oil spills at sea is to use oil skimmers. A skimmer is a machine
that separates oil or particles floating on a liquid surface. Skimmers are categorized
as oleophilic skimmers, suction skimmers and weir skimmers based on their
functions.

1.2 Oil Effluence Accident from Nakhodka Tanker
In 1997, the Russian tanker Nakhodka, weighing 13,157 tons, sank in the Japan
Sea reportedly causing an oil spill which were at forms over detected a distance of
6,240 kiloliters. In spite of offshore oil collection attempts, and as a result of strong
winds and rough winter weather, a large amount of spilled oil drifted into the Japan
Sea. Consequently, vast amounts of this heavily emulsified oil washed up on the
Japan Sea shorelines. The oil spill had a serious impact both ecologically on the
shoreline environment and economically on coastal activities such as fisheries and
tourism (Shimada & Kato, 2013). This accident indicated some problems in the
Japanese oil spill response including in the chain of command (Questions were
raised regarding: Who is in charge of the operation, and who is the manager of the
clean-up?). Furthermore, issues that needed to be improved was to the initial
response and the insufficient national contingency plan.

1.3 Oil spills from offshore industry
According to Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) in Japan, the output
of oil and gas from offshore industry is decreasing from 2007. The cause of this
decrease is low production figures in the oil and gas industry.

At present

circumstances, Japan has one offshore oil and gas field, Iwafune-oki oil and gas
field. This oil and gas field was discovered in 1983 and production was commenced
in 1990. The offshore platform was settled at 36 meters’ depth, and cumulative oil
production reached 500,000 ton in 2012.
However, METI continue to investigate the offshore oil and gas industry, even
though the lower price of crude oil in the world. Therefore, due to innovation of
drilling technology, along with extension of continental shelf, the possibility of finding
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oil and gas in offshore area will be increasing in the future. As a consequence, it will
be important to be prepared not only for the pollution from the ships, but also the
offshore incident in Japan.

1.4 Aim
The aim of this dissertation is to better understand the state of oil spill preparedness
in Japan today and use the findings to recommend improvements. Oil spills refer to
any oil pollution from ships, and offshore industry which has become more important
recently. After the oil spill accident from Nakhodka tanker, Japan reviewed the
contingency plan and the chain of command. Considering that this review, recent
development in the area of oil spill contingency the fact
Therefore, it is a good time to review the oil spill preparedness, since approximately
20 years has passed since the Nakhodka tanker accident.
This research has been done by analyzing Japanese preparedness as a case study
and explaining the cause of any deficiencies in national preparedness. Any oil spills,
affecting the Japanese Territorial Sea or Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) are
considered. This thesis seeks to answer the overall question “Can Japan handle big
oil spills and how effective is the preparedness comparing to countries like Norway
and the United States.”
The research questions are the following:



What has the U.S. and Norway learnt from previous oil spill accidents, and how
did you change oil spill response and preparedness system.?



When the accident occurs, how are the chain of command and management in
Japan, Norway and United Sates?



Based on contingency plan, how is the emergency call network, and can this
network use the available equipment efficiently?
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In training system or accident response, how do government corporate with
stake holders and other parts of society?



Comparing to other countries, what aspect is lacking in the Japanese national
contingency plan?

1.5 Dissertation Structure
This thesis is divided into 4 chapters.

Chapter 1. Introduction
The first chapter describes the economic and environmental impacts of oil pollution.
The chapter also discuss the present Japanese experiences which includes the
Nakhodka tanker accident and the offshore platform. The chapter also presents
research aims, questions, and the dissertation structure.

Chapter 2. Oil pollution at the sea
This chapter assess the Japanese experiences of oil spills including the Nakhodka
tanker accident, and the national contingency plan before and after this accident.
This chapter also examine Norway’s oil spill contingency plan and management as
an example, and compare the advantages and disadvantages between Japan and
Norway in oil spill preparedness.

Chapter 3.
The third chapter treats oil spills from offshore industry. It describes the current
condition of the offshore oil platform in Japan, Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the U.S.
and based on this information, consider the effectiveness of regional and national
contingency plan.

Chapter 4.
The last chapter contains an analysis and the conclusions based on chapters 2 and
3. Then making some proposal.
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1.6 Conclusion
The combatting of the oil pollution from Nakhodka tanker, showed some deficiencies
in the Japanese oil spill response, including a slow and ineffective initial response,
problems in the chain of command and the slowness of reacting to the advice from
experts. After this accident, Japan reviewed the national contingency plan, and
continued training for oil spill. This thesis, will attempt to establish the present state
of preparedness of the Japanese oil spill contingency, and compare it to other
developed countries

Chapter2 Oil Spills from vessels

2.1 Oil spill Contingency Plan

2.1.1 Significance of Oil Spill Contingency Plan
The purpose of contingency plan is to provide the procedures and organizational
structures for oil spills, and release the hazardous substances. In general, the oil
spill contingency plan is categorized 3 parts based on the scale, “National
Contingency Plan”, “Local Contingency Plan” and “Area Contingency Plan”
(Murakami, 2001). However, each contingency plan mostly should comprise three
parts, strategy section, action and operations section, and finally data directory
(IPIECA, 2000). Firstly, a strategy section, which should describe the scope plan,
including the geographical coverage, perceived risks, roles/responsibilities of those
charged with implementing the plan and the proposed response strategy. Secondly,
an action and operations section, which should set out the emergency procedures
that will allow rapid assessment of the spill and mobilization of appropriate response
resources. Finally, a fata directory, which should contain all relevant maps, resource
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lists and data sheets required to support an oil spill response efforts and conduct the
response according to an agreed strategy (IPIECA, 2000).

2.1.2 Response Policy
When making contingency plan, it is important to clarify the response policy clearly.
The typical example is the method of recovery. For instance, United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (U.K.) is known to use chemical recovery
aggressively. However other countries including Norway, Sweden or Japan have the
priority to use the mechanical collection. The reasons for these differences in policy
is due to oceanographic conditions and how the countries prioritize environmental
damage.

2.1.3 Net Environmental Benefit Analysis
When considering about making contingency plan, Net Environmental Benefit
Analysis (NEBA). NEBA is a methodology for identifying and comparing net
environmental benefits of alternative management options, usually applied to
contaminated sites (Efroymson, 2004). This concept is useful to consider about oil
spill response, which tool will minimize impact on the environment and community.
As already discussed, the strategy how to deal with an oil spill (whether to use
dispersants, focus on mechanical recovery, and physical recovery) have benefits
and drawbacks. Therefore, in this chapter, it clarifies how to make use of NEBA,
then clarifying previous spill histories.

Firstly, an assessment is made how to make NEBA in each oil spill combatting
scenario: recovery, mechanical recovery, physical recovery or using dispersants.
Each method has benefits and drawbacks. Dispersants can remove surface oil that
could affect wildlife and keep oil from spreading to shorelines. In addition to this,
they enhance natural biodegradation of oil. Nevertheless, dispersed oil has the
potential to affect water column-dwelling organisms and vegetation. Then,
mechanical recovery can remove oil with minimal environmental impact, however,
mechanical recovery is extraordinarily slow and labor-intensive, with typically no
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more than 10-20 percent oil recovered. Lastly, physical removal can reduce
secondary impacts to animals that reside on shoreline and prevent remobilization of
the oil. However, aggressive removal methods may impact shoreline and shore
organisms, again with typically no more than 10-20 percent oil recovered.

The planning phase for a NEBA, which is comparable to the planning and problem
formulation phases in risk assessment (EPA 1998), includes setting the goals of
assessment, selecting a limited and feasible suite of alternative actions, defining the
temporal and spatial scope of assessment, identifying contaminant and remediation
stressors, selecting environmental services and other ecological entities, selecting
metrics and methodologies for the comparison of alternatives, selecting measures of
exposures and effects, selecting a reference state, establishing a link between
stressors and services (conceptual model), and developing an analysis plan (Fig.2).
A comparative assessment such as a NEBA should have a plan that encompasses
relevant actions.
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Fig.2 Framework for Net Environmental Benefit
Source: A Framework for Net Environmental Benefit Analysis for Remediation or
Restoration of Petroleum-Contaminated Sites
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2.2 Oil Spill Response in Japan

2.2.1 National Contingency Plan
Japan’s national contingency plan was decided by cabinet in 1995, after Nakhodka
accident. In addition to this accident, this plan was amended in 2006, in response to
Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Cooperation to pollution Incidents by
Hazardous

and

Noxious

Substances,

2000

(OPRC-HNS

Protocol).

The

amendments in 2006 has 2 points. Firstly, the changing of object substances.
Secondly, noting about “am emergency team composed of the director generals of
the respective ministries and agencies” (Ministry of Environment). The national
contingency plan has 18 pages, and also they have 204 pages’ materials.
The composition of Japan’s national contingency plan is as followed.

Chapter1 Introduction
Section1 the purpose of this plan
Section2 the relationship with other plans

Chapter2 Basic matters about the preparedness of oil spills
Section1 Comprehensive development
Section2 Adjustment of response system
Section3 Adjustment report and contact system
Section4 Adjustment related equipment
Section5 Training
Section6 Regional cooperative structure

Chapter3 Basic matters about the correspondence with oil spills
Section1 Basic concept about the protected matters
Section2 Establishment of correspondence system
Section3 Contact system with regard to oil spills
Section4 Evaluation of oil spills
Section5 Implementation of countermeasure
Section6 Provision of information about oil spill equipment
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Section7 Health and safety management of pest control work practitioner
Section8 Implementation of the rescue of wildlife
Section9 Implementation of fisheries conservation measures
Section10 Securing of maritime traffic safety and risk prevention
measures
Section11 Public relations
Section12 implementation of the post monitoring

Chapter4 Mutual cooperation of the relevant administrative organizations
Section1 National cooperation
Section2 Regional cooperation

Chapter5 Others
Section1 Promotion of research and technology development
Section2 Review of this plan

2.2.2 Local Contingency Plan
Based on “Act on Prevention of Marie Pollution and Maritime Disaster”, Japanese
Coast Guard (JCG) categorized sea area as 16 parts. In this section, it aims to
invest the “Tokyo bay oil spill contingency plan” as example.

11

Fig.3 Target sea areas and Names (1)
Source: Japanese National Contingency Plan
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Fig.4 Target Sea Areas and Names (2)
Source: Japanese National Contingency Plan
The composition of “Tokyo bay oil spill Contingency plan” is as followed.

Part1 General rules
1. Purpose
2. Target sea area of this plan
3. Basic policy
4. Modification of this plan

Part2 Ocean area
Chapter1 the current situation
1. Overview
2. Oil storage facilities
3. Mooring facility
4. Maritime traffic situation
5. Marine accident situation
6. Occurrence of marine pollution
7. Weather and sea condition
8. Fishing industry
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9. Surrounding environment
Chapter2 Assumption of marine pollution
1. Assumption of oil spills
2. Basic policy about marine pollution
Chapter3 Prevalence of oil spill control materials and maintenance goals
1. Storage situation
2. Maintenance goals
Chapter4 Communication and exchange of information
1. Communication
2. Exchange of information
3. Marinating the communication measures
4. Communication and exchange of information
Chapter5 Risk Prevention
1. Control of the discharged oil and preventing the danger
2. Notes of the target sea area

Part3 Control measures of oil spills in the open ocean
1. Weather and sea condition
2. Current status of the oil spill control equipment
3. Control of the discharged oil and prevention of the danger

This regional oil spill contingency plan is categorized 3 parts, general rules, ocean
area, and control measures of oil spills in the open ocean. General rule describes
the purpose of this plan, basic policy and target sea area. The second part is
categorized 5 chapters, the situation of target sea area, assumption of marine
pollution, prevalence of oil spill control materials and maintenance goals,
communication and exchange of information, and risk prevention.

The situation in target sea area e.g. storage facilities, fishing industry and marine
traffic is described in the first chapter. The second chapter discuss the risky of
pollution of marine pollution and notes the 2 critical factors, the weather and the
amount of discharged oil. The third chapter describes the available of oil spill control
materials and maintenance goals. It discusses the current situation and target
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depending on the above assumptions. The fourth part shows the communication
flow charts. Finally, the fifth part discuss risk prevention and notes importance of the
initial response, control system and operation manual about the oil spill.

2.3 Specific Spill Response Based on Contingency Plan in Japan
As already discussed, Japan review the emergency management after Nakhodka oil
spill accident. In this chapter, it aims to clarify the Japanese oil spill response
management based on Oil Spill contingency plan, especially about “A chain of
command”, “Sensitivity map”, “Response Equipment”.

2.3.1 A Chain of Command
According to the “National Contingency Plan” chapter 3, the chain of command
among the national government is showed. The chain of command roughly
categorized 3 stages. In the first stage, When the oil spill accidents occur,
“concerned administrative authorities” open “Liaison Council for Ministries and
Agencies” to check and share the information as necessary. In the second stage,
when the oil spill accidents occur, and it needs information aggregation and mutual
contact among the respective ministries and agencies, the government appoints “an
emergency team composed of the director generals of the respective ministries and
agencies” in the cabinet crisis center. In addition to this, the government establishes
the emergency response office in the cabinet crisis center. In the third stage, if
coordination of emergency response needs strongly, government set “Alert
Headquarters” in Japanese Coastguard headquarters, and “The on-site Liaison and
Coordination Headquarters” in the accident site. The managers of each
headquarters are written as Director General of Japanese Coast Guard and
Commander of a Regional Coast Guard headquarters. Therefore, Japanese Coast
Guard is in charge of substantial command.

In conclusion, the issues about a chain of command in the oil spills are mostly
resolved for the time being. When the oil spill accident occurs, “Alert Headquarters”
in Japanese Coastguard headquarters which is controlled by Director General of
Japanese Coast Guard will be in charge of the accident, and they contact and share
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the information with the Cabinet Crisis Center and the On-Site Liaison Coordination
Headquarters.

2.3.2 Sensitive Map
Making and updating sensitivity maps are key activities in the planning process.
These maps convey essential information to spill responders by showing where the
different coastal resources are and by indicating environmentally sensitive areas
(IPIECA, 2000).

According to IPIECA, the sensitivity map should be included with protected area,
important areas for biodiversity (not legally protected), sensitivity ecosystems,
critical habitats, endangered species and key natural resources are considered
sensitive to oil spills. The reason is that they are of environmental, economic, or
cultural importance, at risk of coming in contact with spilled oil, and likely to be
affected once oiled or affected by the oil even without direct contact.

In addition to this, they also notice that sensitivity maps are useful for every levels,
“decision maker”, “On-Scene Commanders and Operations Managers”, and “OnSite Responders”. However, the importance of each of them are different. For
instance, the role of decision maker is defining general response strategy at national
or regional level (mobilized for big oil spills), the task of On-Scene Commanders and
Operations Managers is developing response tactics to respond to spill and manage
operations in the field, and the role of on-site responders is implementing operations
on site. Therefore, the maps should also be categorized “Strategic maps” for
decision makers, “Tactical maps” for On-Scene Commanders and Operations
Managers, and “Operational maps” for On-Site responders.

Strategic sensitivity maps are developed, at a smaller graphic scale, to provide a
broader perspective and to synthesize information, locating and prioritizing the most
sensitive sites. The decision makers would use these maps with the objectives of
locating and prioritizing the most sensitive sites, and to reinforce the response
capabilities for these areas during the preparedness effort) and resolve the issue of
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competing priorities in the event of limited protection and clean-up resources during
an incident.

Tactical sensitivity maps are used as a general planning and response tool. During
an incident, they are used by the people in charge of the coordination of the
operation on site (the On-Scene Commanders) and in the incident command post
(Operations Manager). These maps provide responders with all required
environmental, socio-economic, logistical and operational information to plan and
implement response and protection operations. They can include additional
information to assist the user (clean-up technical guidelines, environment protection
and restoration recommendations, etc.).

Operational sensitivity maps are optional. They may be developed only for the most
sensitive sites identified, at a much larger scale than strategic or technical maps,
and are designed to be used by the on-site responder. They include information on
the general logistical and operational resources (as on the tactical sensitive maps)
and, more importantly, sit-specific information to provide detailed information for onsite oil spill responders.
In Japan’s case, Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) is in charge of Coastal
Environmental Information Service & Environmental Sensitivity Index. They provide
the location which storages the oil spill response equipment, the natural
environment which will be affected by the oil spill and the location and information of
related facility. In particularly, they provide 2 important types of information, the first
one is “Coastal Environmental Information Service (CeisNet) “, and the second one
is “Environmental Sensitivity Index map (ESI map)”. CeisNet is the online service
which provides coastal environmental information service. They offer these services
through Web Geographical Information System (Web GIS). ESI map is pdf format
map, and the number of the maps are 100, which covers all of Japanese coast.

Environmental Sensitivity Index (ESI) is adopted for clarifying for the various types
of shoreline (and river or lacustrine ecosystems). The ESI, ranging from 1 (low
sensitivity) to 10 (very high sensitivity) integrates the shoreline type (grain size,

17

slope) which determines the capacity of oil penetration and/or burial on the shore,
and movement; exposure to wave (and tidal energy) which determines the natural
persistence time of oil on the shoreline; and general biological productivity and
sensitivity (IPIECA, 2000). the colour code of sensitivity code is as followed.

Fig.5 Colour Code of the Environmental Sensitivity Index
Source: Sensitivity mapping for oil spill response

In conclusion, JCG has already prepared the tactical sensitivity maps as the oil spill
response authority. Except these maps which made by JCG, some of local
government have developed their own sensitivity maps.

2.3.3 Response Equipment
JCG equipped the oil spill response equipment in each region based on the
contingency plan. In addition to this, after the Nakhodka oil spill accident, “National
Strike Team Basement” was equipped in Yokohama. National Strike Team is the
expert team in Japanese Coast Guard. The National Strike Team provides guidance
and advice on how to control oil and hazardous and noxious substances that have
spilled into the sea, as well as on extinguishing and preventing the spread of fires at
sea. It also coordinates with involved parties and carries out disposal measures of
its own as the situation demands.
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In addition to the preparedness by the Government effort, the private sector also has
the duty to provide oil spill response preparedness. Japan defines the cooperative
structure based on “Act on Prevention of Marine Pollution and Maritime Disaster”.
According to the article 39 (3), it notes the ship owner’s obligation to be prepare for
pollution response and clean-up measures. Such a response capability should be
based on OPRC – HNS convention.

In the private sector, Petroleum Association of Japan (PAJ) built up and maintains
the stockpile bases of oil spill response equipment, and maintenance contractors
are implementing appropriate and periodical check-up of the devices. By the end of
June 1996, 11 stockpile bases are completed and ready for use (Figure3). Six bases
in Japan are located in the premises of refineries faced six major waters (PAJ, 2012).

Base
Location
Solid boom (m)
Inflatable boom (m)
Oil skimmer
Inhalable barg (tonn)

1 Tokyo Bay
Ichihara
7,240
1,702
10
25

2 Seto Inland Sea
Mizushima
4,200
1,630
13
25

3 Ise bay
Yokkaichi
2,280
1,452
16
25

4 Sea of Japan
Niigata
2,120
1,630
11
25

5 Hokkaido
Muroran
2,120
1,630
11
225

5 Hokkaido
Wakkanai
960
322
2
0

6 Okinawa
Uruma
2,280
1,440
9
25

Table1 Japan’s Equipment Stockpile Bases and Equipment
Source: MAJOR OIL SPILL RESPONSE PROGRAMME

In order to determine the response equipment, the government has to decide their
response policy clearly. In Japanese case, National Contingency Plan chapter3(5)
notes the prevention measures to oil spills. However, it is not enough to show the
measures. National Contingency Plan should also write detailed usage standards.
(Murakami, 2011). Among that, using the dispersants is critical issue. Dispersants
can be an effective response to oil spill and can minimize or prevent damage to
important sensitive resources (ITOPF, 2011). In common with other response
techniques, the use of dispersants must be considered carefully, to take into
account oil characteristics, sea and weather conditions, environmental sensitivities
and national regulations on dispersant use (ITOPF, 2011).
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In using dispersants, there are 3 important factors to be considered: dispersant
choice,

environmental considerations,

and timing.

Firstly,

dispersants are

manufactured according to different formulations, and their effectiveness varies with
oil type (ITOPF 2011). Therefore, it is necessary to choose the appropriate
dispersant in each oil spill care. Secondly, despite improvements in dispersant
formulations, the toxicity of the dispersant/oil mixture to marine fauna and flora is
often the major environment concern (ITOPF, 2011). Finally, avoiding delays at the
time of a spill is a key factor. The decision on whether dispersants can be used and
if so, the precise circumstances under which they may be used need to be agreed
during the process of developing contingency arrangements for oil spill response.
In Japan’s contingency plan, there is regulation about the using about dispersants.
However, there are some restrictions and the main response method regarding their
use. The contingency plan considers mechanical collection, using oil booms,
skimmers etc. The contingency plan also notes the timing when dispersants can be
used. According to the plan dispersants use should be preceded by consultation
with stakeholders. However, when an accident occurred, it is too late to consult with
stakeholders after the oil spill accident. Therefore, prior consultation with
stakeholders about the condition and timing of using dispersants.

2.3.4 International Cooperation
As international effort, Japan cooperated with Russia, Chania, and South Korea.
The typical international effort is establishing “The Action Plan for the Protection,
Management and Development of the Northwest Pacific Regional Seas Programme
(NOWPAP)”. It was adopted in September 1994 as a part of the Regional Seas
programme of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

The Northwest Pacific region features coastal and island ecosystems with
spectacular marine life and commercially important fishing resources. The region is
also one of the most densely populated parts of the world, resulting in enormous
pressures and demands on the environment.
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The overall goal of the Northwest Pacific Action Plan is “the wise use, development
and management of the coastal and marine environment as to obtain the utmost
long-term benefits for the human populations of the region, while protecting human
health, ecological integrity and the region’s sustainability for future generations”.

2.3.5 Current Situations
In 2014, JCG checked 235 oil spill response accidents. Compared to 2013, the
number of oil spill disaster has declined 22. The JCG advised and guided to the
polluters, because of polluter-pays-principle. Among of oil spill response, 125 of oil
spills are large-scale or not enough polluter-pays-principle, so JCG corresponded
with them (JCG Annual report 2015).

2.3.6 Conclusion
Japan’s OSER was dramatically changed after Nakhodka oil spill accident. In this
accident, it was criticized the unclearness of chain of command (who in charge of
the accident). In addition to this, too few disposal options were available for clean-up
managers to consider (ITOPF, 1999). Therefore, as part of national contingency
plan review, efforts should be made to identify more economically viable options for
storage and separation of oil waste for recycling and recovery.

Compared to the previous National Contingency Plan the revised one contains three
important changes. The first one is a revised chain of command based. The second
on is the establishment of sensitivity maps. The last one is enhancing the response
equipment. Firstly, the National Contingency plan notes placing “Alert Headquarters”
in Japanese Coastguard headquarters, and “The on-site Liaison and Coordination
Headquarters” in the accident site. Therefore, it is cleared that the Director General
of JCG manages and take command. The National Contingency Plan also shows
the structure of the cabinet. Secondly, JCG made the sensitivity maps after the
Nakhodka oil spill accident. The first one is “Coastal Environmental Information
Service (CeisNet) “, and the second one is “Environmental Sensitivity Index map
(ESI map)”. These maps show the sensitivity and resilience in different types of
coasts through different colours and lines. Finally, Japan enhanced the oil spill
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response equipment both in the governmental and private sectors. In the Local
contingency plan, they note the current number of the oil spill response equipment
and the future targets of the response capacity. In addition to this, JCG enhanced
the national Strike Team. This team aims to be a specialist for dealing with the
marine oil and other dangerous hazardous spills.

However, Japan did not solve the issues about the timing of using dispersants. In
Local Contingency Plan, it is noted that dispersants may be used after discussing
with stakeholders (including fishing and tourist industry). However, how this will be
done in a meaningful way during an oil spill emergency is not explained.

2.4 Oil Spill Response in Norway
The Norwegian National Oil Spill Emergency Response (OSER) system is a multilevel system based on private, municipality, and state system. There is a division of
labour between the different levels identified in the contingency plan. Companies
(operators), terminals, and Clean Seas Association are to provide OSER for spills
caused by their operations (largely offshore petroleum). Municipalities (430 in
number) and inter-municipal emergency response regions (further inter-municipal
regions) are set up to handle smaller spills and shoreline operations. The state
system led by the Coastal Administration is aimed at oil spills from marine shipping
and larger incidents (Sydnes, 2011). Among those, the Norwegian Coastal
Administration (NCA) is

the primary government

agency responsible for

safeguarding the coastline, including ensuring preparedness in cases of acute
pollution. The NCA’s Department for Emergency Response is located in Horten. An
Emergency Response Centre which reports to the Department of Emergency
Response has the operational responsibility for the government response. NCA has
established 27 oil response depots along the coastline, 16 of which are main depots
(ITOPF, 2011). The Norwegian OSER is a complex structure with private, municipal,
and state-level sectors. However, when needed the different levels of contingency
(or units therein) may request support from other response providers. In the
Norwegian OSER system all providers of services are required by law to provide
assistance when required.

The duty to assist and cooperate is ensured by a

compensation scheme that guarantees that all coasts derived from providing such
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assistance will be reimbursed (PCA 1981 2;76). PCA 1981 also notes the three
levels of contingency are to operate as a single integrated response operation when
required. Therefore, in the case of an oil spill, the Coastal Administration will monitor
OSER operations and may enter or take over such operations when deemed
necessary (PCA 46). There are no formally established criteria for when the Coastal
Administration may take control over OSER operations (PCA 46)

2.4.1 Response Policy
The primary objective of Norwegian spill response is to contain and cover the oil as
close to the source as possible. Chemical dispersion is considered to be
supplementary to physical removal. To this end, every organization required to have
an oil spill contingency plan should consider dispersant use as a strategy. The
Climate and Pollution Agency (Klif), under the Ministry of Environment, is the
competent authority for dispersant approval and regulations. NCA authorities
dispersant use in situations where dispersants would be beneficial but the conditions
have not been laid out in a contingency plan as part of requirements from Klif.
Applications for the use of dispersants should be based on a Net Environment
Benefit Analysis (NEBA) (ITOPFF, 2011). When private sector uses the dispersants,
the company has to apply for a permit from the NCA.

2.4.2 Pollution Control Act 1981
The Pollution Control Act of 1981(PCA 1981) is the legal basis that establishes the
general requirements for the OSER system and the basic principles, demands, and
obligations to the organizations involved in activities that may cause acute pollution
in Norway (PCA1981).

2.4.2.1 The Outline of Pollution Control Act
The Pollution Control Act of 1981 is the basic regulation that sets the preconditions
for oil spill emergency preparedness in Norway, and which describes demands and
obligations of the different parties. In accordance with the Pollution Control Act, a
system has been established that applies to three levels.
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First, oil companies have the primary responsibility for dealing with acute pollution
closest to the source. Offshore oil and gas projects as well as largest facilities on
land need to have oil spill preparedness systems in place. The companies operating
on the Norwegian Continental Shelf have organized themselves into the Norwegian
Clean Seas Association for Operating Companies (NOFO), which manages
emergency response systems, develops contingency plans and supports research
and development of oil response equipment. In case of an accident, the use of
mechanical equipment is the primary strategy and the companies are required to
have response equipment in place for each individual project.

Second, coastal municipalities have an important operational responsibility. They
are obliged to have necessary equipment in stock to deal with smaller, acute spills
and should be able to provide crews with equipment in case of an emergency.
Norway is divided into 34 emergency-regions, each with an inter-municipal
committee for acute pollution. The Coastal Administration considers these
committees as the core of the total Norwegian preparedness network.

Third, the state is responsible for emergency response in case of major incidents of
acute pollution when spill response by private and municipal preparedness is not
sufficient. The state shall prevent acute pollution and ensure that the responsible
polluter or municipality takes appropriate measures when acute pollution occurs.
The overall responsibility for oil spill preparedness in Norway lies with the Ministry of
Transport and Communications, with the Coastal Administrations as advisory,
planning, controlling, and executive bodies. In the NCA, the Incident Command
Team, has the important role to control the overall progress of the oil spill recovery.
Apart from the Coastal Administration (NCA), other governmental agencies have
important roles. The Petroleum Director (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy) and the
Petroleum Safety Authority (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs) have monitoring
and reporting responsibilities. The responsibility for follow-up lies with the Norwegian
Environment Agency (subject to the Ministry of Climate and Environment), which
plays an important role in establishing environmental regulations for petroleum
activities. It sets the criteria for the environmental equipment for preparedness
systems and monitors compliance with the environmental regulations. With respect
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to the environmental effects of oil and gas activities, the Ministry of Climate and
Environment has the overall responsibility (Figure. 5)

Fig.6 Outline of the Organization of Central Government Responses
Source: Norwegian National Contingency Plan

2.4.2.2 Notification Procedures
The Pollution Control Act regulates the notification procedures the event of an acute
oil spill (Fig. 6). The notification procedure stipulates that any information regarding
an oil spill is submitted to the Norwegian Coastal Administration. The notifications
will be in the form of direct telephone contact or a report depending on the level of
emergency. When an oil spill occurs, vessels must notify one of the Joint Rescue
Coordination Center (JRCC) or the nearest coastal radio station. The operator of a
petroleum installation must notify the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA).
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When an aircraft observes an oil spill, the crew must notify the Notice To Airmen
(NOTAM) office. Finally, land based operations must be notified via the emergency
services 110 (911) which goes to the fire brigade. All related organization,
JRCC/coastal radio station, PSA, NOTAM and 110 (911) have all their own
instructions that regulate how and when they should notify NCA.

Fig.7 Notification Procedures of Norwegian Oil Spill
Source: Norwegian Coastal Administration

2.4.3 National Contingency Plan
In section 43, subsection 3 of the Pollution Control Act, authority has been
delegated to the Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA) to ensure the best
possible coordination of operational emergency preparedness for acute pollution in
a national system. Therefore, the National Contingency Plan (NCP) has been drawn
up as part of the fulfilment of the duty. It does not establish any new duties for the
agencies mentioned. However, the NCP facilitates fulfilment of their responsibilities
to establish their own plans for ensuring that they can contribute to the NCA’s
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coordinated emergency preparedness for acute pollution. The legal basis of NCP is
the Pollution Control Act, Harbour Act, and Svalbard Environmental Protection Act.

The NCP is divided into private, municipal and governmental contingency areas with
specific responsibilities based on Pollution Control Act.

All contingency plans and organizations are standardised and coordinated so that in
the event of a major national emergency, the national contingency system will work
as a single integrated response organization. The system is highly developed with
equipment widely distributed through the country. Industrial plants that might cause
significant oil pollution are obliged to establish an adequate level of preparedness.
Governmental requirements primarily apply to operators on the Norwegian
Continental Shelf, the crude oil terminals refineries and companies distributing oil
products as well as major industrial companies (ITOPF, 2011).

2.4.4 The Response Requirement
The NCA maintains the response equipment which the government is in charge of.
This equipment is stored in response depots along the coast, which hold a variety of
booms, skimmers, off-loading units and other response kit. In addition, there are
booms and skimmers as well as smaller equipment, protective clothing etc. stored
on 9 Coast Guard vessels and 4 specialized recovery vessels operated by the
Coastal Administration. Also, a number of naval defence vessels are on contract,
capable of oil recovery, transportation or acting as lead offshore command vessels.
Vessels from the civilian coastal patrol (Norwegian Sea Rescue) can also be used,
as well as vessels of opportunity such as fishing boats.

In addition, the private sector is in charge of the response equipment. NOFO has a
number of large supply ships as its disposal, which can be converted for oil recovery
operations at short notice. NOFO also maintains 5 equipment depots, at Stavanger,
Mongstas, Kristiansund, Treana and Hammerfest. These depots have similar,
compatible equipment, consisting of large heavy duty containment system. In
addition, NOFO have contracted helicopters to enable infra-red photography with a
down link system with responding ships, allowing oil movement monitoring and
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recovery both a day and night, for limited dispersant spraying operations. The oil
industry also maintains large stockpiles of equipment, including vessels, at the oil
refinery terminals of Statoil Mongstad and Esso Splagen and the crude oil terminal
of Norsk Hydro Sture. Several bunker stations have small amounts of equipment.
Because of the extensive range of equipment held by national and local government
agencies and the oil industry, there is little need for private clean-up contractions in
Norway.
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Fig.8 Equipment Depots for Oil Spill Response
Source: Norwegian Coastal Administration
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2.4.5 International Cooperation
With the northwards expansion of offshore petroleum activity into the Arctic Ocean,
there is a concern of the adequacy of emergency response system. Oil exploration
and production in these areas is challenging due to harsh weather conditions,
darkness, ice, icing, and large distances. Norway cooperates with other countries,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Russia, Sweden, and the United States as a
member of Arctic Council.
In this section, a general description is given regarding how to operate under severe
Arctic conditions. Furthermore, the role of the Artic Council will be reviewed. In
addition, a review will be given regarding the recent guidelines oil spill preparedness
and response in the Arctic.

As means for the international cooperation in Arctic region, the Ottawa Declaration
established “Arctic Council” as a high level intergovernmental forum to provide a
means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among Arctic States,
with the involvement of the Arctic Indigenous communities and other Arctic
inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable
development and environmental protection in the Arctic (Agreement on Cooperation,
2014). The Council’s activities are conducted in 6 working groups, which include
individual mandates and a common structure comprised of a chairmanship (which
rotates through the member states), a management board or steering committee
and a supporting Secretariat. Each working group includes representatives from the
Arctic Council member states and representatives from the Permanent Participants.
In addition, group meetings may be attended by observe states, observe
organizations, or invited guests or experts to participate at meetings or in projects.
All working groups operate under the Principle of Consensus. The six groups are 1)
Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP), 2) Arctic Monitoring and Assessment
Programme (AMAP), 3) Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), 4)
Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR), 5) Protection of the
Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), 6) Sustainable Development Working Group
(SDWG).
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Among these groups, EPPR, AMAP and PAME are relevant when it comes to oil
spill preparedness and response and preparedness. EPPR addresses different
aspects of prevention, preparedness and response to environmental emergencies in
the Arctic. EPPR was established by the declaration on the protection of the Arctic
environment, which was signed June 14, 1991 in Rovaniemi, Finland. The aim was
to establish a network for information on Arctic accidents and for facilitating, cooperation among the Arctic states around emergency prevention, preparedness and
response (11).
PAME has the key responsibility for the Council’s activities related to the protection
and sustainable use of the Arctic marine environment. In 1997, PAME published its
first report on Arctic offshore oil and gas guidelines. This was updated in 2002 and
2009. Another important document resulting from the Arctic Council’s work on these
issues is the AMAP Working Group’s Arctic Oil and gas 2007 assessment in which
the PAME and EPPR working groups participated. The objective was to present a
holistic assessment of the environmental, social, economic and human health
impacts of current oil and gas activities, and to evaluate the likely course of
development of Arctic oil and gas activities and their potential impacts in the near
future. The report included some key findings related to emergency response in the
Arctic. Generally, responding to major oil spills remains a challenge in remote, icy
environments. One of the conclusions of the AMAP report was that there are no
effective means of containing and cleaning up oil spills in broken sea ice.

The task force and guidelines about oil spill response and preparedness
In addition to 6 working groups, there are several task forces that operate within the
framework of the Arctic Council, based on Arctic Council rules of procedures article
28. The task forces are appointed at the Ministerial meetings to work on specific
issues for a limited amount of time. The task forces are active until they have
produced the desired results, at which point they become inactive.

As the current task force related to oil spill response and preparedness, the Nuuk
Declaration, on the occasion of the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council,
outlined the Council’s intention to establish a task force to develop an international
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instrument on oil pollution preparedness and response (the Agreement) in May 2011.
This agreement was considered an important step forward on Arctic State
cooperation in preparing for the increase in oil and gas and shipping activities that
are expected to occur in the coming years. Initial challenges included establishing
the geographic scope or areas of application, and the commitment to a legally
binding or non-binding agreement.

Overall, the Agreement serves largely as a means to operationalize, in the unique
conditions of the Arctic, the broader international Convention on Oil Pollution
preparedness, Response and Co-operation 1990, to which all Arctic States are party.
It provides for parties to cooperate and assist a Party which requests assistance to
respond to an oil pollution incident. Key elements of the Agreement also include
commitments to:

1) provide mutual assistance in the event that an oil spill exceeds one nation’s
capacity to respond
2) undertake appropriate monitoring activities to identify oil spills in areas within a
party’s national jurisdiction
3) promote cooperation and coordination among the Parties by endeavouring to
carry out joint exercises and training
4) promote the exchange of information that could improve the effectiveness of
response operations
5) conduct a joint review of activities undertaken during a coordinated response
operation.

2.4.6 Previous Experience
Norway has suffered a number of ship-source spills. In 2007, the bulk carrier MV
SERVER ran aground some 30 nautical miles north of Bergen spilling an estimated
375 tonnes of IFO 180. Shoreline clean-up operations were conducted using mainly
local labour, improvised equipment and manual techniques. In 2009 the bulk carrier
FULL CITY grounded off Langesund spilling estimated 1,154 tonnes of heavy fuel oil
(IFO 180) which subsequently contaminated about 100km of shore. Due to the rocky,
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heavy-indented nature of the coastline, clean-up was logistically difficult and was
mainly carried out manually with limited use of heavy machinery or aggressive
cleaning techniques. The container ship GODAFOSS grounded in southern Norway,
10km from the Swedish border, in February 2011 and about 120 tonnes of IFO 380
was released into the sea. Over 500 birds, mainly eider ducks, were estimated to
have been oiled. The presence of large quantities of sea ice, coupled with
temperatures of around -20 ℃ , posed a challenge to ordinary spill response
techniques and strategies. One of the more effective techniques involved a
combination of brush belt skimmers assisted by steam heating jets which enhanced
the separation of oil from ice. This incident provided an opportunity to observe the
Copenhagen agreement in action, which facilitated the integration of the Swedish
Coastguard into the response operation.

After these accidents, NCA concluded that impacts of a spill on the marine
environment is dependent on its size, timing and location, and on the oil type,
season and the presence or absence of vulnerable nature resources (Experience
from oil spills, 2012). In addition to this, environmental monitoring was initiated the
first twenty- four hours after the oil spill occurred (Experience from oil spills, 2012).

2.5 Oil Spill Response in U.S.

2.5.1 The Outline of Oil Spill Response in U.S.
The sequence of events following the Deepwater Horizon oil blow-out will be given
below. However, first a description of the U.S. oil spill response will be given. This
section focuses on legal basis, contingency plan and chain of command.

In U.S. The Oil Pollution Control Act of 1990 (OPA) was created for a
comprehensive prevention, response, liability, and compensation regime to deal with
vessel- and facility- caused oil pollution to U.S. navigable waters (United States
Coast Guard, 2016). The organization of OPA includes setting new requirements for
vessel construction and crew licensing and manning, mandating contingency
planning, enhancing federal response capability, broadening enforcement authority,
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increasing penalties, creating new research and development programs, increasing
potential liabilities, and significantly broadening financial responsibility requirements
(United States Coast Guard, 2016).

In the U.S. the protection of the marine environment is the responsibility of the
Federal Government. For this purpose, a National Contingency Plan (NCP),
Regional Contingency Plans (RCP) and Area Contingency Plans (ACP) have been
established. NCP is the federal government’s blueprint for responding to both spills
of oils and hazardous substances (US Environmental Protection Agency). The legal
basis of this plan is the Comprehensive Environment Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980, article 105. The first NCP was developed and published in
1968 in response to the massive oil spill from the oil tanker Torrey Canyon off the
coast of England. To avoid the problem faced by response officials involved in this
accident, U.S. officials developed a coordinated approach to cope with potential
spills in U.S. waters. The first plan provided the comprehensive system of accident
reporting, spill containment and clean up. The plan also established a response
headquarters, a national reaction team and regional reaction teams.

Congress

has broadened the scope of the NCP over the years. As required by the Clean
Water Act of 1972, the NCP was received to include a framework for responding to
hazardous substance release, as well as oil spills. Following the passage of
Superfund legislation in 1980, the NCP was broadened to cover release at
hazardous waste sites requiring emergency removal actions. Over the years,
additional revisions have been made to NCP to keep pace with the enactment of
legislation. The latest revisions to the NCP were finalized in 1994 to reflect the oil
spill provisions of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.

In U.S. the chain of command is well organized. An important part of this
organization is the “Federal On Scene Coordinator (Federal OSC)”. Federal OSC
are the federal officials predesignated by U.S Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) to coordinate the overall response to the
emergency.
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Federal OSC is a designation for an individual that is responsible for providing
access to federal resources and technical assistance, coordinates all federal
containment, removal, and disposal efforts and resources during an oil or hazmat
incident. The Federal OSC serves as the point of contact for coordination of federal
efforts with the local response community, coordinates, monitors, or directs
response efforts.

During an oil or hazmat incident, EPA will usually provide OSCs in the inland zone,
and the USCG will generally provide OSCs in the coastal zone. The OSC
coordinates all federal containment, removal, and disposal efforts and resources
during an incident under the NCP or the Federal Response Plan (FRP). The OSC is
the point of contact for the coordination of federal efforts with those of the local
response community. EPA has approximately 200 OSCs at 17 locations nationwide;
USCG has 46 Marine Safety Offices (MSOs), spread among the nine USCG
Districts, each of which is headed by a Captain of the Port (COTP), who acts as an
OSC.

Under the NCP, OSCs have the responsibility to oversee development of the Area
Contingency Plan (ACP) in the area of the OSC’s responsibility. The NCP states
that the development of ACPs should be accomplished in cooperation with the
Regional Response Team (RRT), and designated local and state representatives,
as appropriate. In both contingency planning and spill response, the OSC is
responsible for coordinating, directing, and reviewing the work of other agencies,
Area Committees, RPs, and contractors to ensure compliance with the NCP and
other plans applicable to the response.

In conclusion, managing oil spill is based on enhancing the power of OSCs. The
responsibility of OSCs is assessment, monitoring and response assistance. Firstly,
the assessment involves evaluating the size and nature of a release or spills, its
potential hazards, the resources needed to contain and clean it up, and the ability of
the responsible party or local authorities to handle the incident.
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Secondly, in the case of oil spills, the OSC is legally required to monitor the
response if the spill poses a substantial threat to the health and welfare of the public
due to its size or characteristics.
Thirdly, once a release or spill has been assessed, the OSC determines whether
federal assistance will be necessary to help control and contain it (US
Environmental Protection Agency, N.D).

2.5.2 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Accident
The Exxon Valdez oil spill was a major oil spill which occurred in Prince William
Sound, Alaska, starting March 24, 1989. According to official reports, the ship was
carrying approximately 55 million US gallons (210,000 m3) of oil, of which about 10.1
to 11 million US gallons (240,000 to 260,000 bbl.; 38,000 to 42,000 m3) were spilled
into the Prince William Sound. This oil spill accident triggered the development of
the Oil Pollution Control Act. Below a review is given regarding the impacts of the
Exxon Valdez oil spill as well as some of the lesson learned based on the report to
the president.

The report to the president, note effects on birds, marine mammals, and fisheries.
When the accident occurred, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) counted more
than 91,000 water birds (waterfowl or shorebirds) around the accidental are. Then
many of birds may be affected either directly by oil or indirectly through the loss of
food sources. Therefore, the 4,463 dead birds collected do not represent the full toll.
Around the accidental area, twenty-three species of marine mammals live either
year-round or during the summer. These mammals include gray, humpback, and
killer whales, various porpoises and dolphins, harbor seals, sea lions, and sea otters.
Although the experts have different opinions, one researcher says that 2,800 to
5,000 sea otters died because of direct and indirect effects of the oil spill. Oil can
affect microscopic plants (phytoplankton) and animals (zooplankton) adversely. For
some species morality of planktonic eggs and larvae may result in long-term
population effects.
Long-term effects to the area’s rich biota may result from food chain and habitat
disruption as well as from decreased survivability and reproductive capability of
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animals directly exposed to oil. Another economically significant long-term effect
could be the possible loss of this year’s young herring from the affected areas.

2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, reviewed the oil spill response in Japan, Norway, and U.S. In the
Japanese case, the contingency plan for oil spills was revised after the Nakhodka oil
spill. The plan notes the responsibility scheme (essentially, JCG will be in charge of
the large oil spill), and also show the communication flow among the national
government, local government and the concerned ministries/agencies.

The Norwegian oil spill response, their system consists of multi-level management
and a complex structure with private, municipal, and state level actors (Figure 4). To
clarify this complex management framework, the key legislation is the “Pollution
Control Act” and the key agency is the Norwegian Coastal Administration. Based on
the Pollution Control Act, multi-level management may be mobilized to act as one
integrated national system. The leading agency is the Norwegian Coastal
Administration,

especially

the

Department

of

Emergency

Response.

This

department is responsible for maintain the national contingency, including all three
(private, municipal and state) levels. In addition, the NCA has the formal role to
coordinate with related organization. The Climate and Pollution Agency(Klif) and the
Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA) have issued documents/guidelines that
clarify the assessments needed to be documented in emergency response analyses
and in the oil spill contingency plans or before dispersants can be used.

The U.S. response system is described in the National Contingency Plan legally
based on the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. This legislation stipulates a Federal On
Scene Coordinator (Federal OSC) who is in charge of oil spill response. The Federal
OSC will be predesigned from United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) or United States Coast Guard (USCG) to coordinate response sources.
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Chapter3 Oil Spills from Offshore Industry

3.1 Offshore Oil Platform

3.1.1 Types, Mechanism and Riskiness
An offshore oil or gas platform is a large structure with facilities to drill wells, to
extract and process oil or nature gas, and/or to temporarily store product until it can
be brought to shore for refining delivery to the market. In this section, it clarifies the
types, mechanism and riskiness of the offshore oil and gas platform.

According to NOAA, Types of offshore oil and gas structures are categorized with 7
types, 1, 2) conventional fixed platforms: 3) compliant tower; 4, 5) vertically moored
tension leg and mini-tension leg platform; 6) Spar; 7,8) Semi-submersibles; 9)
Floating production, storage, and offloading facility; 10) sub-sea completion and tieback to host facility (Fig.9) (NOAA, 2005).
One type of offshore platform used in some offshore oil and gas fields in the
world is the semi-submarine platform. These platforms have hulls (columns and
pontoons) of sufficient buoyancy to cause the structure to float, but of weight
sufficient to keep the structure upright. Semi- submersible platforms can be
moved from place to place and can be ballasted up or down by altering the
amount of flooding in buoyancy tanks. They are generally anchored by
combinations of chain, wire rope or polyester rope, or both during drilling and/or
production operations, though they can also be kept in place by the use of
dynamic positioning. Semi- submarine platform is one of the common type
platform. For instance, Deepwater Horizon which are used in Gul of Mexico, and
the platform used in Iwafune-oki, which is located in Japanese water is also this
type of oil platform.
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Fig.9 Types of Offshore Oil and Gas Platform
Source: NOAA OCEAN EXPLORE

3.1.2 Offshore Oil Platform in Japan
The Japanese offshore (oil and gas) industry is developing rapidly against all odds.
Presently Japan has only one platform for oil and gas production, placed in the
Iwafune–oki oil and gas field. This oil and gas field was discovered in 1983 and
production was commenced in 1990. The offshore platform was settled at 36meters
depts, and cumulative oil production reached 5 million kilolitres in 2012.

3.2 A Case Study Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in the Unites States
3.2.1 Analysis of the Cause of the Accident and Impact
The world’s largest accidental release of oil occurred in 2010 when the offshore
drilling rig, DEEPWATER HORIZON, suffered an explosion and subsequently sank
in the Gulf of Mexico, releasing an estimated 4.9 million barrels of oil into the marine
environment (ITOPF, 2012). The platform was 396 feet (121m) long and 256 feet
(78m) wide and could operate in waters up to 8,000 feet (2400m) deep, to a
maximum drill depth of 30,000 feet (9,100m) (Transocean, 2010). The platform had
historically been used for deep wells, including the deepest underwater gas and oil
well in history at 35,055 feet (10,685m) in 2009 (Transocean, 2010). At the time of
the explosion, the rig was drilling an exploratory well. There are 6 main causes of
this accident. 1. Small diameter hole obstructed mud circulation, 2. Valves to
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prevent cement backflow did not close, 3. Cementing inadequate, 4. Pressure test
wrongly interpreted, 5. Rising oil and gas not monitored, 6. Fail-safe on seabed
wellhead was unable to close.

3.2.2 Correspondence to This Accident
Time series of BP oil spill disaster (Gurdian research, 2010)

On 20 April
Explosion and fire on Deepwater Horizon. 11 people are reported missing and
approximately 17 injured. A blowout preventer, intended to prevent release of crude
oil, failed to activate.

On 22 April
Deepwater Horizon rig sinks in 5,000ft of water, Reports of a five-mile-long oil slick.
Search and rescue (SAR) operations by the US National Response Team begins.

On 23 April
The rig is found upside down about a quarter-mile from the blowout preventer. A
Homeland Security Department risk analysis says the incident “poses a negligible
risk to regional oil supply markets and will not cause significant national economic
impacts”. White House press secretary says: “I doubt this is the first accident that
has happened and I doubt it will be the last”.

On 24 April
Oil is found to be leaking from the well. A Homeland Security report on critical
infrastructure says the problem has “no near-term impact to regional or national
crude oil or natural gas supplies”.

On 25 April
US coast guard remote underwater cameras report the well is leaking 1,000 barrels
of crude oil per day (bpd). It approves a plan for remote underwater vehicles to try to
activate a blowout preventer and stop the leak.
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On 27 April
The US Department of Interior and the Homeland Security Department announced
plans for a joint investigation of the explosion and fire. The Coast Guard announces
it will set fire to the leaking crude to slow the spread of oil in the Gulf. Minerals
Management Services (MMS) approves a plan for two relief wells. The Homeland
Security Department’s infrastructure and risk analysis center reports: “Release of
crude oil, natural gas and diesel fuel poses a high risk of environmental
contamination in the Gulf of Mexico”.

On 28 April
The Coast Guard says the flows of oil is 5,000 bpd, five times greater than first
estimated, after a third leak is discovered. Controlled burns begin on the giant oil
slick.

On 29 April
President Obama talks about the spill at the White House, his first public comments
on the issue. He pledges “every single available resource”. Including the US military,
to contain the spreading spill, and also says BP is responsible for the clean-up.
Louisiana declares as a state of emergency due to the threat to the state’s natural
resources, as the oil slick approaches land.
On 30 April
An Obama aide says no drilling will be allowed in new areas until the cause of the
Deepwater Horizon accident is established.

As the countermeasure to this accident, dispersants were used on an unpresented
scale following the incident, about 40% of which were injected at the source of the
spill 1.5km below the sea surface. In-situ burning was also used in an effort to
minimize impacts to the shoreline and sensitive resources and is estimated to have
eliminated approximately 5% of the total volume spilled. A number of factors
contributed towards the successful use of burning in this case, primarily the distance
from the shoreline, which reduced concern about the potential impact on public
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health of harmful or prolonged smoke exposure, and the continuous supply of fresh
oil from the well head, which extended the “window of opportunity” to use the
technique (ITOPF, 2012).

3.2.3 Environmental Impact of the Oil Spill
After this accident, many environmental impacts were reported. The environmental
accident will be categorized according to impacts by the oil itself, and the impacts
caused by the clean-up.

Firstly, an oil spill affects marine environment directly in a number of ways. In the
DEEPHORIZON case, it is reported that marine organisms including corals,
dolphins, seabirds were affected by the oil spill. In addition, the beaches were also
affected by the oil spill. A study of the sands of the contaminated beaches and
marshes showed that the variety of organisms including those at the, lowest levels
of the food chain, had dropped dramatically since the spill (Halanych, 2012).

The clean-up activities also caused impacts. The use of dispersants is one such
activity. Also, beach clean-up resulted in damage to the vegetation and in some
cases erosion. Scientists and fisherman are pointing to the spill, the dispersants and
chemicals used in its clean up as the cause of mutated fishes (Jamail, 2012). A
2014 study of the effects of the oil spill on Bluefin tuna, published in the journal
Science, found that oil already broken down by wave action and dispersants was
more toxic than fresh oil (Tuna study reveals how pollution causes heart problems,
2014). The use of dispersants also affected the beaches. They made oil sink faster
and more deeply into the beaches, and possibly groundwater supplies. The
researchers found that Corexit EC 9500A which was the most widely used
dispersant allowed the PAHs to permeate sand where, due to a lack of sunlight,
degradation is slowed (GAYLE, 2012). However, others points at the advantages of
using dispersants in this case. The results of the current study demonstrate that
microbial populations are susceptible to toxicity from the use of Corexit EC 9500A
when applied at a prescribed concentration (Hamdan, 2011). Then hydrocarbon
degradation in the marine environment is dependent
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on the ability of

microorganisms to utilize hydrocarbons for growth and metabolism. Therefore, using
dispersants in this case is a good effect to recovery the environment.

3.2.4 Lesson Learned from DEEPWATER HORIZON Oil Spills
After the DEEPWATER HORIZON oil spill accident, National Commission on the BP
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling made the report to the president.
In this section, it clarifies the recommendations, especially about oil spill response,
planning and capacity. According to the commission’s recommendations, they
address three critical issues or gaps in the government’s existing response capacity:
(1) the failure to plan effectively for a large-scale, difficult-to-contain spill in the
Deepwater environment or potentially in the Arctic; (2) the difficulty of coordinating
with state and local government officials to deliver an effective response; and (3) a
lack of information and understanding concerning the efficiency of specific response
measures, such as dispersants and booms (DEEPWATER, 2011).
(a) The Need for Improved Oil Spill Response Planning
The Department of the Interior should create a rigorous, transparent, and
meaningful oil spill risk analysis and planning process for the development and
implementation of better oil spill response.

The Department of the Interior should review and revise its regulations and
guidance for industry oil spill response plans in light of the lessons learned from the
Deepwater Horizon experience. A new process for reviewing spill response plans is
needed. This process should ensure that all critical information and spill scenarios
are included in the plans, including oil spill containment and control methods to
ensure that operators can deliver the capabilities indicated in their response plans.
In addition, the new entity within Interior that is charged with overseeing offshore
safety and environmental protection will have to verify operator capability to perform
according to the plans.

(b) The Need for a New Approach to Handling Spills of National Significance
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Coast Guard should establish
distinct plans and procedures for responding to a “Spill of National Significance.”
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(c) The Need to Strengthen State and Local Involvement
EPA and the Coast Guard should bolster state and local involvement in oil spill
contingency planning and training and create a mechanism for local involvement in
spill planning and response similar to the Regional Citizens’ Advisory Councils
mandated by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.

3.3 Assumption in Japan
As already discussed in Chapter 2, Japan established and renewed its national,
regional and area contingency plans. The national contingency plan, clearly show
the chain- of command when an oil spill has occurred, and the plan also establish
the communication chain. In addition, Japan also has upgraded the mechanical and
chemical oil spill response equipment in both government and private sectors.

This this section analyses preparedness for oil spills from the offshore industry
based on regional and area contingency plans.

3.3.1 Sakhalin-Ⅱ project

3.3.1.1 Local Contingency Plan
Sakhalin Energy Investment Ltd which is a major actor in the area has developed
their preparedness based on a worst-case scenario which is the blowout accident in
the Piltun Astokhskoye platform. The amount of blowout in the scenario is
1,270kl/day in a total of 10 days. Sakhalin Energy Investment Ltd note that they can
manage this oil spill by using their equipment and the equipment of their contractors.
However, under certain conditions the oil spill will also affect the north part of Japan.
Therefore, after launching this project, the local contingency plan (Hokkaido coastal
area) will be added to this project. According to this plan an assumed oil spill from
Piltun Astokhskoye and the assumed response to it is described in section 4 (13
pages). Their oil spill response is classified 6 chapters (see below).
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Chapter 1. Weather and sea conditions
Chapter 2. Sakhalin offshore oil field
Chapter 3. Assumption of marine pollution
Chapter 4. Available oil spill control equipment
Chapter 5. Prevention of oil spill
Chapter 6. Procedure Proceeding of collected oil

This plan is included with HOKKAIDO coastal local contingency plan, and after
launching Sakhalin project, JCG added the section about preparedness to this
project. According to this regional contingency plan, they note the possibility about
drifting ashore in Japan, in case of a major oil spill accident in Sakhalin offshore oil
field. The assumption is as below.

1. When the blowout accident in the oil field occurred, approximately 1,270 kl of
crude oil spilled to the sea.
2. The oil spill cannot be controlled for up to three days, because of stormy sea
weather.
3. About 30% of the spilled oil evaporated to the air and dispersed naturally into the
water. The remaining oil, about 2,700kl transformed into mousse, and the volume of
oil-and-water expanded 3 to 5 times, to approximately 8,000kl to 13,000kl. This high
viscosity oil started to drift towards the Japanese coast.
4. This assumption is based on the summer season event, because the flow of
ocean current is the most earliest in that season. The oil is expected to be reached
around Hokkaido waters in 26 days. In 32 days after the oil spill accident, the oil is
expected to reach HOKKAIDO coastal area, which is located 540 miles from
Sakhalin offshore oil field.
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Fig.10 Oil Spill Trajectory Prediction
Source: Japanese Local Contingency Plan

3.3.1.2 Area Contingency Plan
In addition to the local contingency plan, which JCG established (referred 3.3.2),
Sakhalin Energy Investment Company Ltd. (Sakhalin Energy) and Japan’s National
Maritime Research Institute developed an Area Contingency Plan for the Northern
Coastal Hokkaido area (area plan). The scope of this contingency plan analyses the
affected area, when a vessel source oil spill accident occurs in Aniva Bay or Le
Perouse Strait.
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The basic concepts of this area plan are on-site security, prevention of the spill at
the source, removing spilled oil which is considered an environmental risk, and
protection of property. To implement these concepts, this area has a strategy
section, beach cleaning guidelines, and dispersants use guidelines. The strategy
section includes oil collecting points and how to arrange oil booms. The content of
this area plan is as followed.

Chapter 1. Overview, and assumed scenario
Chapter 2. Oil spill preventing strategy
Chapter 3. Oil spill preventing tactic
Chapter 4. On-site safety and logistical support
Appendix A. Organization chart
Appendix B. Oil spill assessment manual (offshore)
Appendix C. Oil spill assessment manual (onshore)
Appendix D. Beach cleaning guideline
Appendix E. Environmental impact guideline of beach cleaning
Appendix F. Offshore Recovery guideline in Hokkaido north coastal area
Appendix G. The guideline of spraying dispersants in Hokkaido north coastal area
Appendix H. Oil spill response equipment in Hokkaido north coastal area
Appendix I. Logistic support guidance

In this plan, the acute oil spill will be categorized according to tier 1, tier 2, and tier 3
based on guidelines from International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the
International Oil and Gas Industry Association for Environmental and Social Issues
(IPICA). Tierc1 is an oil spill with an amount of spilled oil up to 〜100kl. This plan
assumes that the oil spill of tier 3 will affect to Japanese coastal area. The amount of
spilled oil is over 100kl, and the cause of oil spill is the tanker collision or grounding
from the Sakhalin area.

The characteristics of this area plan are as follows: The area plan contains
dispersant use guidelines. A novel part of these guidelines is that they establish
“Spraying avoidance area” and “Spraying agreement area”. Spraying avoidance
area is the area where the organizations cannot spray dispersants. These areas are
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decided among stakeholders in advance. According to Japan’s National Maritime
Research Institute, dispersants will not sink under 10 meters, mostly they will sink to
about 8 meters. Therefore, Japan’s National Maritime Research Institute decided
that dispersants can be spray at depths deeper than 20 meters. In addition,
adjusting to demands from the fishing industry, they decided to prevent spraying
dispersants closer than 2 miles from shoreline. However, this guideline also notes
that the organization has to discuss with stakeholders before spraying dispersants.

3.3.1.3 Environmental Impact
Regarding the environmental issues related to Sakhalin-Ⅱproject, Sakhalin Energy
Ltd. published several documents including an Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA) based on internationally accepted standards, and the EIA-Addendum (EIA-A).
Environmental impact is categorized as the effects caused by the construction of the
platform, and those caused by oil spills from vessels or the platform itself.

The laying of the pipeline may impact the ecosystem due to siltation and physical
damage to the seabed habitats. Also noise during the piling in connection with the
establishment of the platform may be destructive to the environment. In addition,
vessels used during the construction may case contamination such as spills and air
emissions, and they may cause damage to slow-swimming marine mammals
(strikes). In particular the North-western Pacific Gray Whale is highly threatened and
very vulnerable. According to IUCN’s Expert Panel on the Gray Whales of the area
there are only less than 200 individuals left of this species. Some of these impacts
may also affect Japanese waters. The affected species are sea lions or seals. The
number of sea lion is decreasing now. The IUCN considers sea lion as endangered
(EN) in the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species. There are colonies in isolated
islands in the Sea of Okhotsk and Kuri islands. These sea lions migrate to Hokkaido
in Japan. Four types of seals also occur in the Sea of Okhotsk. They breed on the
ice. They follow the ice to Hokkaido during the winter season, then they live in the
Sea of Okhotsk during summer season. Seals are one of the tourist attractions in
Japan. Therefore, the oil spill impact is large for not only their habitats, but also
tourist industry.
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3.3.2 Iwafune-oki Oil and Gas Field Case
Iwafune-oki oil and gas field case is in Hokuriku coastal area. However, the local
contingency plan which is made by JCG does not give any information about this
offshore platform. The amount of output has decreased recently. However, it is
important to prepare for an accident. In general, the assumption of oil spill from
offshore industry is easier than a vessel source oil spill. The location and the type of
oils are already known, and meteorological and sea conditions are also well known.
Therefore, JCG should consider the existence of this platform in the local
contingency plan and make scenarios for accidental spills.

Chapter4 Analysis and Discussion

4.1 Evaluation

4.1.1 National Response Capacity
This section analyses the number of and capacity of oil spill response equipment.
The

typical

oil

spill

response

equipment

are

booms,

dispersants,

deployment/recovery vessels and oil skimmers. Among that, Table1 and 2 shows
the number of oil recovery vessels and the number of oil skimmer in Japan (based
on calculations by the author from Japan’s local contingency plan).
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Oil recovery vessel in Japan

Number of vessel

Total tonnage (GT)

Total oil recovery
rate (kl/h)

1 HOKKAIDO coastal area

1

50

80

2 TOUHOKU coastal area

6

1059

326.8

3 TOKYO bay

9

689.6

492

4 KANTO-TOKAI eastern coastal area

3

134

77.4

5 ISE bay

6

5448.17

1325

6 TOKAI western coastal area

3

94.93

170

12

1116.95

484

7 OSAKA bay-HARIMANADA coastal area
8 SHIKOKU southern coastal area

0

0

0

9 SETO inland sea eastern coastal area

5

304.51

245.9

10 SETO inland sea middle coastal area

4

340.73

167

11 SETO inland sea western coastal area

7

5309

1676

12 KYUSYU southern coastal ara

5

242.5

118.6

13 SANIN coast・WAKASA bay area

1

320

89

14 HOKURIKU coastal area

3

4439

1402

15 KYUSYU southern coastal area

4

544

224

16 OKINAWA coastal area

1

99

100

Table2 The Number of Oil Recovery Vessels in Japan
Source: Japanese National Contingency Plan

Oil skimmer in Japan

Number of oil

Number of

skimmer

installation place

Oil recovery rate
(kl/h)

1 HOKKAIDO coastal area

23

17

902

2 TOUHOKU coastal area

22

21

436.04

3 TOKYO bay

53

29

919.6

7

7

100.5

22

13

335

0

0

0

37

24

567.2

1

1

25

17

11

726

10 SETO inland sea middle coastal area

28

18

450.4

11 SETO inland sea western coastal area

9

8

432

25

19

383.6
340

4 KANTO-TOKAI eastern coastal area
5 ISE bay
6 TOKAI western coastal area
7 OSAKA bay-HARIMANADA coastal area
8 SHIKOKU southern coastal area
9 SETO inland sea eastern coastal area

12 KYUSYU southern coastal ara
13 SANIN coast・WAKASA bay area

8

7

14 HOKURIKU coastal area

16

12

660

15 KYUSYU southern coastal area

15

15

713.7

16 OKINAWA coastal area

16

10

351

Table3 The number of oil skimmer in Japan
Source: Japanese National Contingency Plan
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Japan’s National Contingency Plan does not specify a particular size of an oil spill
that the country’s capacity should be able to deal with. Several other countries have
designed their capability according to a given amount of oil in the spill. However,
each local contingency plan includes an oil spill scenario. When considering the
corresponding capacity, one method is given by the National Response Capacity
(NRC). NRC was calculated with following considerations such as efficiency,
mobilization efficiency and operating capability of response personnel after
calculating mechanical recovery capability of oil recovery ships and oil skimmers
(Lee, 2001). The formula of NRC is as below.

NRC(kl)= recovery Capacity (kl/h) × Working Hours (3days × 8hours/day) ×
Mechanical Efficiency (0.2) ×Mobilization Efficiency (0.33) ×Operating Efficiency
(0.65)

When using this formula and applying the data in Table 1 and Table 2 the figure
obtained is 14,700 kl on the entire national level. In the absence of other
assessments, this formula may be used to give an indication of the response
capability.

4.1.2 PSM and RETOS™
Process Safety management (PSM) is an analytical tool focused on preventing
release of any substance defined as a highly hazardous chemical. According to
OSHA3132-PSM, the principles of PSM is that if, despite the best planning, an
incident occurs, it is essential that emergency pre-planning and training make
employees aware of, and able to execute, proper actions (Herman, 2000). The tool
which the concept of PSM applied to oil spill response is RETOS™. Readiness
Evaluation Tool for Oil Spills (RETOS™) was developed to assist governments and
companies in assessing their level of oil spill response planning and readiness
management in relation to commonly agreed pre-established criteria considering
international Best Management Practices. This tool is suggested in 2008
International Oil Spill Conference. However, as far as we know it is not mandatory
anywhere. According to Regional Association of Oil, Gas and Biofuels Companies in
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Latin America and the Caribbean (ARPEL), this tool has already used in some
countries (including Norway and U.S, but Japan has not used yet). The key feature
of this tool is that RETOS™ can be used to create similar tools and assess the level
of emergency management readiness in relation to PSM pre-established criteria.
This tool can show the global performance (refer to fig.10). Therefore, it will be
useful for Japan to consider about oil spill response system.

Fig. 11 The Sample of Global Score
Source: Using the Reediness Evaluation Tool for Oil Spills in Process Safety
Management
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4.2 Analysis about Legal Basis and National Contingency Plan

4.2.1 The Defect of Japan’s Oil Spill Response in Nakhodka Oil Spill
Accident
After the Nakhodka oil spill accident, two defects in the Japan’s oil spill response
were detected, 1) the management system, 2) the shortage of fundamental
information and confusion on-site. As already discussed, some of these issues have
already been dealt with in the revised national Oil Contingency Plan.

1) The management system
In the Nakhodka oil spill accident, it was criticized that the management system was
not effective. In Japan, the jurisdiction of Coast Guard is at sea, and local
governments manage the coastline. Therefore, when the oil spill occurred, JCG
collected the oil in the sea, and the local government collected the oil which drifted
to the shoreline. In addition, the environment agency managed the environmental
matters, and the fishery agency was in charge of fishing industry. Therefore, there
was not the integrated management, and the response was not coordinated (Shikida
& Kato 2003).
After the accident, the deficiencies in the management system was noted and JCG
set up an office to deal with the problems. In particular, the revised National
Contingency Plan establish that the government sets up “Alert Headquarters” in
JCG headquarters, and also establish “The on-site Liaison and Coordination
Headquarters” at the accident site.

2) The shortage of fundamental information and confusion on-site
In the Nakhodka oil spill accident, the shortage of fundamental information disrupted
the work on-site. In particular, no expert advice was available because of New Year
holidays. In addition, the on-site did not have enough information about the hazards,
local environment, different approaches to collection of oil spills, and drifting
forecasts were missing (Shikida & Kato, 2003).
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In response to these issues, JCG made three changes in order to better be able to
be better prepared to respond to oil spill accidents, enhancing the structure of
National Strike Team, advancement of the Trajectory Prediction, and making the
ESI maps.

4.2.2 Can Japan Handle the Big Oil Spills
After the Nakhodka oil spill accident, Japan has improved oil spill response from
vessels in both in terms of improving the knowledge and in the form of hardware.
Luckily, Japan has not experienced and large oil spill accidents since the Nakhodka
oil spill. So, it is not concluded that they can handle the certain of the amount of oil
spill. However, as this thesis clarifies, their response and preparedness improved in
both of the hard and the soft aspects.

4.3 Recommendations
Based on the analysis, this paper has three recommendations to Japan’s oil spill
response. First, clear standards are needed regarding the use of dispersants.
Second, is the need to include spills from the offshore industry in the contingency
plans. The last one is the reviewing system after the disaster.

1) Establishing the clear standards about using dispersants.
As already discussed, Japan’s oil spill response is mostly focused on using
mechanical one (booms, skimmers, etc.), and the Norwegian response is the same.
This is because both countries’ fishing industry is prosperous. In Deepwater Horizon
accident, it was reported that the environmental damages, which were affected by
not only oil itself, but also using dispersants. Therefore, the prior understanding of
stakeholder is inevitable to use them. In addition, the choice and timing is other
issue to use dispersants. According to ITOPF, there are some limitations of
dispersants, sea condition, oil properties, and conflicts with other response methods.
Therefore, it is important to have the prior consultation with stakeholders and note
the timing and usage standard in contingency plan.
In the area contingency plan for Sakhalin- Ⅱ oil spill accident, they made the
guideline about spraying dispersants. However, this is the special case. In this case
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it is clear that the site of incidence, and the type of oil, because of the oil spill from
offshore industry. In Japan’s future oil spill response scheme, they shall note the
usage standard clearly based on prior consultation with stakeholders.
2) The assumption of the offshore oil industry oil spills.
As already discussed in Chapter 3, oil spills are not only caused by ships, but also
the offshore oil and gas industry. Actually, the number of the vessel oil spill
accidents are decreasing, because of IMO regulations. Deepwater Horizon oil spill
accident is still fresh in our minds. Therefore, contingency plans should also
consider this type of oil spills. In Japan, they researched some offshore oil and gas
field, and there are some offshore oil and gas field around Japan. Moreover, an
accident during the Sakhalin-Ⅱproject may affect to Japan’s marine environment.
According to Polluter-Pays Principle, Sakhalin Energy Investment Ltd, which operate
this offshore platform make the contingency plan to respond to a blowout. The oil
and gas field is located in Russia, however, the spilled oil may be carried to
Japanese coast in the certain sea conditions. Therefore, the local contingency plan
(HOKKAIDO coastal are) should consider spills of this type.
However, national and local contingency plan which were made Japan’ Coast Guard
did not note anything about the offshore oil industry around Japan. They shall write
and predict the accidents

3) Making the review system after the oil spill disaster.
The last one is the reviewing system on National Contingency Plan, and Local
Contingency Plans. Presently the National Contingency Plan stipulates that
government considers the development continuously, and review the plans, when it
is necessary. The local Contingency Plans writes that they consider the plan every
year, and they reflect opinions from the local oil spill response council based on the
Act on prevention of marine Pollution and maritime Disaster article 43, 6, 2. In
addition, they note the relationship between JCG and concerned administrative
authorities and local government. When JCG review the plan, they have to listen the
opinions from the manager of concerned administrative authorities and local
governments. Also, JCG have to notice the reviewing points to them, when JCG
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change the plan. As National Commission on Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
Offshore Drilling said, Government should note the reviewing system in their
National or Local contingency plan. The reviewing system should adapt Plan Do
Check Action (PDCA) cycle, and apply the lessons of the past to the contingency
plan directly. In addition, government should notice the Public Comment Scheme in
National and Local Contingency Plans. In recent years, the system of public
comment is applied, when ministries make the plan. Therefore, the government and
Coast Guard should develop this kind of system, and apply the comment to the
contingency plans as a result of lessons learned from future oil spill accidents.

4.4 Conclusion
According to ITOPF report, the number of large oil spill accidents in the world is
decreasing. This is because some IMO regulation and the effort of each country.
However, it is important to prepare in peacetime. In recent years, Deepwater
Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico is known as the largest oil spill, and the spill
caused serious environmental destruction.

Japan has not experienced a large oil spill since the Nakhodka oil spill in 1997. After
this oil spill, Japan founded some fault of oil spill response. As a result, the country
renewed and rearranged the contingency plans.
In this plan, Japan’s contingency plan clearly notes the chain of command. When a
large oil spill occurs, JCG will be in charge of the accident. As the responsible
organization and person, government will establish an Alert Headquarter in JCG
headquarter, and The On-site Liaison and Coordination Headquarter in the accident
site. In this case, the Director General of JCG and Commander of a regional Coast
Guard headquarters will be the responsible persons. When a big accident occurs, it
is better that one person should have the responsibility and authority. This system is
applied in the U.S. response system (Federal On Scene Coordinator).

In addition, Japan made the sensitivity map after the Nakhodka accident. As chapter
2 showed, Japanese Coast Guard made ESI map and also the Coastal Information
Service (CeisNet), which is the online map through Web GIS.
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However, compared to the system of dealing with oil spills in Norway and the U.S.
the Japanese system is different and this paper puts forward the following three
recommendations. 1) Establishing the clear standards about using dispersants, 2)
The assumption of the offshore oil industry oil spills, 3) Making the review system
after the oil spill disaster.
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